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Abstract
 
The current crisis in the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea has resulted in an explosive increase in the illegal migration of North
Koreans to Northeast China. The refugees’ presence is seen as a nuisance by
all sides involved, but their experience is increasingly influencing domestic
policy in North Korea.
 
The current social and economic crisis in the Democratic
PeopleÕs Republic of Korea (DPRK) has resulted in an explosive increase in
the illegal migration of North Koreans to Northeast China. The stream of North
Korean refugees is a new phenomenon, but its extent has become one of the
factors exercising considerable inßuence on the situation in the region.
At the same time, the current refugee crisis has a surprisingly low proÞle in
the international media. Northeast Asia has not witnessed an illegal cross-border
movement of such magnitude for decades. The refugee crisis directly inßu-
ences the survival chances of the present regime in Pyongyang and could have
a huge impact on the regional political situation. Yet, only when refugees
manage to stage a publicity stunt such as the high-proÞle occupations in 2002
of foreign missions in China does the problem attract a modicum of attention
from foreign observers. However, such spectacular actions help only a tiny
fraction of the refugeesÑand adversely inßuence the fate of the majority.
To a very large extent, the low proÞle of this potentially explosive problem
stems from political pressures from Beijing, Pyongyang, and Seoul. The refu-
gees, estimated at around 100,000, are caught in a complex web of hidden
agendas pursued by all sides involved in the crisis and, more broadly speaking,
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the Korean problem in general. The refugee case also provides us with interesting
insights into the changes occurring in Northeast Asia after the end of the Cold
War and the power of inertia behind some vestiges of Cold War rhetoric. This
article traces the development of the refugee issue and the policies of the
countries involved. It also dwells on the likely consequences of the ongoing
crisis and its impact on the situation in North Korea.
 
Refugees in Manchuria
 
Few symbols demonstrate the dramatic changes in Northeast Asia as vividly as the
growing exodus of North Korean refugees to China in the past few years. Typi-
cally, this large-scale border movement, once unthinkable, is seen as a result of the
famine that has ravaged North Korea since 1996. To a large extent, this view is ac-
curate. However, the phenomenon of this movement would be impossible without
the deep changes occurring inside the North Korean state and transformations
of the perception of the ÒKorean problemÓ by all of PyongyangÕs neighbors.
Until the early 1990s, the border between North Korea and China was a
zone of stability and control. From the North Korean perspective, stringent
border controls would have been both expensive and unnecessary; an escape
to ÒfraternalÓ China would not lead to grave political consequences. Indeed,
for decades, cooperation between the DPRK and PeopleÕs Republic of China
(PRC) authorities (and their common disregard for such niceties as human
rights) ensured that potential defectors would stand little chance to Þnd asy-
lum across the border. In fact, Chinese police were more efÞcient as a deterrent
to defection than the DPRKÕs own border guards.
 
1
 
There were some exceptions. For example, in August 1956, a group of
North Korean leaders, who had taken part in an unsuccessful plot against Kim
Il Sung, easily crossed the border to China, where they eventually found asy-
lum. Ironically, at the end of the 1960s, when the Chinese Cultural Revolution
was at its height, many ethnic Koreans from China ßed to the DPRK, which in
those years was a more stable and prosperous society.
 
2
 
 However, such inci-
dents remained exceptional.
 
1. Sufficient to say that out of five known survivors of the North Korean political prison camps
who have defected to the South, two were arrested in the 1980s for staying in China without proper
permits. An Hy k (often spelled An Hyuk) crossed the border Òout of curiosityÓ in 1986, and Kim
TÕae-jin overstayed his visa while visiting Chinese relatives in 1987. Both were apprehended by
the Chinese, extradited, and spent some time in the relatively liberal (but still deadly) North Korean
Penal Camp #15 in Y dok. See 
 
The Hidden Gulag: Exposing North KoreaÕs Prison Camps 
 
(Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2003), pp. 31—32.
2. ChÕoe Pyong-gukÕs story is quite typical in this regard. He was born in China to an ethnic
Korean family. In the late 1960s, his family moved to the DPRK; in 1987, when he got himself into
trouble with the police, ChÕoe fled back to China. Eventually, he managed to move to Seoul. See
ChÕoe Pyong-guk, ÒKongsan Tokjae ChachÕi-Eso Chayu-R l Kkumkkul Su pstaÓ [One cannot
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In general, the ethnic composition of Northeast China creates a favorable
environment for illegal migration. Two million ethnic Koreans reside in China,
and most of these live near the border with the DPRK. Many ethnic Koreans
have relatives in North Korea; a small portion are even DPRK citizensÑthe
so-called 
 
chogyo.
 
3
 
 On the other hand, in the DPRK there are a small number
of ethnic Chinese (Chinese: 
 
huaqiao
 
). The ethnic Chinese from the DPRK and
ethnic Koreans from the PRC were allowed to visit relatives on the other side
of the border throughout the 1970s and 1980s, when the governments of both
countries were trying to minimize their citizensÕ contacts with foreigners. The
status of these two groups was uniqueÑand was widely used for small-scale
trade purposes. This author remembers from his own personal encounters in
Pyongyang in the early 1980s that many PRC Koreans and DPRK Chinese
were engaged in ÒshuttleÓ trade.
However, the stability of the borderline areas began to deteriorate after
1990, and within a few years the new developments wiped out the old assump-
tions that had made the balance of the previous decades possible. This resulted
from the interplay of several independent factorsÑalthough in the Þnal analy-
sis, most were related to the demise of the Communist bloc. The economic cri-
sis in the DPRK has led to a relaxation of government control over both the
movement of people and their economic activity. The crisis also resulted in an
explosive growth in corruption among North Korean ofÞcialsÑincluding
frontier guards.
 
4
 
 China now also provides many more opportunities for busi-
ness or employment than was the case in the 1980s. Since the establishment of
diplomatic relations between China and South Korea in 1992, the border regions
have been frequented by South Korean tourists, businesspersons, and mission-
aries. This led to rapid growth in living standards for those ethnic Koreans
who were somehow connected with South Korean economic activities. Last
but not least, in reform-era China, the police have somewhat relaxed their grip
on the population. Hunting down the growing Òßoating populationÓ became a
 
dream about freedom under communist dictatorship], in 
 
Puk Han 
 
[North Korea], no. 7 (1997)
(Seoul), pp. 137—39.
3. In 1997 the number of 
 
chogyo
 
 was estimated at 6,000. In other words, they comprise some
0.3% of the Korean population in Northeast China. Song ChÕ l-bok, ÒChogyo-n n Nuguinga?Ó
[Chogyo: Who are they?], 
 
Ky nhyang Sinmun 
 
[Capital and Countryside Newspaper], February 18,
1997, p. 7. Note: all newspaper and most magazine articles cited in this article were retrieved via
the Korean Integrated News Database System (KINDS), 
 
,
 
http://www.kinds.or.kr
 
.
 
. Cited Korean-
language newspapers are published in South Korea unless otherwise indicated.
4. There is little doubt that in recent years, border crossing often involves bribing North Korean
guards. Testimonies to this are abundant in interviews with refugees. For example, see ÒP mjoe
K n l: 4Ó [In the shade of the crime: 4], 
 
Hangere Sinmun 
 
[Korean Nation], August 10, 2002, p. 1;
Kim Kyun-mi, ÒN nhaejin Puk-Chung Kukky ngÓ [The lax border between North Korea and
China], 
 
Taehan Maeil
 
 [Great Korea Daily], March 15, 2002, p. 4.
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mammoth task, one that authorities were unwilling (and often unable) to un-
dertake. Gradual relaxation also meant that the Chinese began to look at the
plight of North Koreans, still subjects of a harsh neo-Stalinist regime, with
understanding and sympathy and less eagerness to Þnd and extradite them.
Together, these phenomena created an important ÒpullÓ factor, an essential
part of any migration process.
However, the ÒpushÓ factor is equally important for migration; this was cre-
ated by developments of the mid-1990s. The catastrophic ßoods in North
Korea led to a crop failure that soon developed into a famine, peaking in
1997—98. It is still difÞcult to estimate the true scale of this catastrophe, but
there is little doubt that the Great Famine of 1996—99 was the worst humani-
tarian disaster in Korea since the end of the Korean War. The three northern
provinces of Yanggang, Chagang, and North Hamgy ng were hardest hit. Ac-
cording to some estimates, up to one-third of their population starved to death
or died of famine-related illnesses.
 
5
 
 As a result, refugees began to move to
China in 1996 in increasing numbers, although this movement did not attract
much attention outside the border area.
It is difÞcult to estimate the refugeesÕ numbers, partly because of the lack of
reliable statistics and partly because this number keeps changing all the time.
The most serious attempt to count the refugee population was undertaken dur-
ing a large-scale study conducted by South Korean sociologists in China be-
tween November 1998 and April 1999, when the famine was at its height. The
study was commissioned by ChohÕ n p s (Good Friend), a South Korean non-
governmental organization (NGO) that plays a prominent role in helping refu-
gees. According to this study, between 143,000 and 195,000 refugees then
took shelter in Northeast China.
 
6
 
After the food crisis in the North eased somewhat, the number of refugees
decreased. In 2001—03, most observers believed that at any given moment,
about 100,000 North Koreans resided illegally in China. In 2002, a former of-
Þcer of the Ministry for the Protection of State Security (the North Korean se-
curity police) who defected to the South estimated the number of refugees at
Òsome 100,000.Ó He also claimed that internal ministry documents that he had
accessed in 1993—98 estimated the annual number of refugees at 50,000.
o
ö
uø oø
 
5. A study conducted among the refugees in China in early 1998 estimated that 32% of their
family members had died in the previous three years. The vast majority of refugees came from
northern provinces; thus, this mortality rate largely reflects the situation there. See Kim Ky ng-
mu, ÒChinan Hae 11-w l Ihu Samangja K pj ngÓ [Rapid growth in the number of deaths since
last November], 
 
Hangere Sinmun
 
, March 10, 1998, p. 1.
6. To date, this study remains the best available field research conducted among the refugees,
and it is widely cited in numerous Korean publications dealing with the topic. The results of the
study were published in 1999 in 
 
Tumangang- l K nn on Saramd l
 
 [People who have crossed
the Tumen River] (Seoul: Ch ngdo chÕulpÕan, 1999), p. 27.
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However, these papers also allegedly stated that a vast majority of these refu-
gees did not stay in China for long and soon returned home. Indeed, return
migration became a common occurrence in the late 1990s.
 
7
 
 S  Tong-man, a
well-known specialist on North Korea, also concurs with this Þgure. In March
2002, he also estimated the number of refugees at about 100,000.
 
8
 
 S  also re-
marked that talk of 300,000 refugees, still common in the South Korean press,
was Òan exaggeration.Ó
 
9
 
 Some sources cite a smaller number; the U.S. Com-
mittee for Refugees puts the total at 50,000.
 
10
 
 One of the most striking features
in the refugeesÕ demographic is the very large proportion of women that made
up some three-quarters (75.5%) of the total.
 
11
 
 Most refugees hide in areas
where ethnic Koreans constitute a large proportion of the local population.
 
12
 
Because a majority of the fugitives are women, many of them have married
local residents. According to the ChohÕ n p s study, in 1998 some 51.9% of
all refugees (overwhelmingly women) were living with their local spouses.
 
13
 
In most cases, such marriages are arranged via Chinese (Han or ethnic Korean)
brokers who are often connected to organized crime. In some cases, these
marriage brokers contact young women and their families while they are still
in North Korea and arrange their trip across the border.
 
14
 
 The girlsÕ decisions,
o
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7. ÒChÕoechÕo Kukka Kukka Anj n Powiby Chidow n ChÕulsin TÕalbukja Yun Chae-IlÓ [Yun
Chae-Il, the first defector who was a cadre at the Ministry for the Protection of State Security],
 
Chos n W lgan
 
 [Korea Monthly], no. 7 (2002), KINDS, 
 
,
 
http://www.kinds.or.kr
 
.
 
.
8. S  Tong-man, ÒKwajangtoen Puk ChÕeje WigironÓ [Exaggerated views of system crisis in
North Korea], 
 
Taehan Maeil
 
, March 19, 2002. Dr. S  expressed the same opinion in a special re-
port written for the Nautilus Institute, see Suh Dong-man, 
 
North Korean Defectors and Inter-
Korean Reconciliation and Cooperation
 
, Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network, Special Report,
May 7, 2002, 
 
,
 
http://www.nautilus.org/pub/ftp/napsnet/special%5Freports/dprkrefugees.txt
 
.
 
.
9. Ibid. Statements about Ò300,000 refugeesÓ can often be found in South Korean publications.
See, for example, P p Ryun, ÒTÕalbukja-Edo Hwahae- i Ongi-R lÓ [The warmth of reconcilia-
tion and the North Korean refugees], 
 
ChungÕang Ilbo 
 
[Central Daily], September 1, 2000, p. 6.
10.
 
U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR) Country Report: China 2001
 
, 
 
,
 
http://www.refugees.
org/world/countryrpt/easia_pacific/2001/china.htm
 
.
 
.
11.
 
Tumangang- l K nn on Saramd l
 
, p. 21. This figure has been confirmed by other re-
search as well. According to Kwak Hae-ryong, women may comprise as much as 80% of all refu-
gees. Kwak Hae-ryong, ÒPukhan ItÕal Chumin Ingwon SiltÕae-E Kwanhan Y nguÓ [A study of the
human rights situation of the refugees who fled North Korea] in 
 
Py nghwa Munje Y ngu 
 
[Study
of Peace Problems], no. 1, 2000, p. 261.
12.
 
Tumangang- l K nn on Saramd l
 
, p. 13.
13. Ibid., p. 24.
14. A female refugee from South Hamgy ng Province reported that she had crossed the
border in February 1998 with a group of five people, four North Korean women and a broker.
All the women had been contacted in the DPRK and agreed to go to China and marry there.
The refugee was sold for 3,500 yuan ($450) to a 30-year-old farmer, with whom she lives quite
happily (ibid., pp. 62—63). Another female refugee crossed the border in March 1999. Her group
consisted of three girls accompanied by a matchmaker who had also located them in Korea. Ibid.,
p. 64.
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in such cases, to marry into Chinese society may be seen as voluntary, although
the choice is still heavily inßuenced by the disastrous economic situation in
North Korea. However, in many cases female refugees move to China to Þnd
employment and foodÑand then are kidnapped by gangsters who sell them to
their future husbands. Sometimes the refugees choose to contact marriage
brokers themselves after they have crossed the border. Their experiences in
China teach them that opportunities for employment are limited and marriage
is the most reliable way to secure their survival.
Whether the woman volunteers for marriage or is kidnapped, the brokers
still receive their commission. According to the press, fees range widely, from
1,000 yuan ($120) to 10,000 yuan ($1,200) per woman. It seems that a typical
price for a woman in her late 20s is some 3,000—5,000 yuan ($400—600).
 
15
 
 The
sum is paid by the husband Òupon delivery.Ó The entire amount goes to the in-
termediaries and/or kidnappers: Neither the woman nor her family gets any-
thing, even if they contacted the marriage brokers themselves.
 
16
 
 There are
occasional references to the sale of young North Korean women to Chinese
brothels, but such cases, apparently, remain a rarity.
 
17
 
 Most of the ÒhusbandsÓ
are people who, for a variety of reasons, e.g., widowers with children, habitual
drunkards, drug addicts, or the handicapped, have had difÞculty Þnding a wife
by more orthodox methods. In many northeastern villages, the mass migration
of young women to the booming cities has resulted in a severe Òbridal short-
age,Ó such that Korean wives are in high demand.
Because refugees remain in China illegally, they are not permitted to enter
into a proper marriage with a Chinese citizen. Such marriages might be sym-
bolically digniÞed with a traditional ceremony and, thus, be perceived as legit-
imate to fellow villagers; for ofÞcial agencies, however, these ceremonies hold
no legal value. The Korean women and their husbands live under constant threat
that the women might be deported or, at the very least, issued a signiÞcant Þne
of 3,000 to 5,000 yuan ($360 to $600). This author is not aware of a single
case in which a female refugee has somehow managed to achieve legal status
 
15. These cases of kidnapping and the Òprice rangeÓ for Korean women are mentioned by many
publications. See, for example, Cho Hy ng-rae, ÒTÕalbuk Y in Insin Maemae K ks ngÓ [The
growth of the trade in North Korean women], 
 
Chos n Ilbo
 
 [Korea Daily], January 12, 1999, p. 27;
ÒP mjoe k n l: 4,Ó p. 1; and 
 
Tumangang- l K nn on Saramd l
 
, pp. 63, 65, 68, 71, 73.
16. Yim l-chÕul, ÒYuritÕang Han n TÕalbuk Y s ngÓ [North Korean female refugees sub-
jected to mistreatment], in 
 
Hangere 21 
 
[Korean Nation] weekly, no. 274, September 9, 1999,
KINDS, 
 
,
 
http://www.kinds.or.kr
 
.
 
. The relevant testimonies can be found in 
 
Tumangang- l K n-
n on Saramd l 
 
as well.
17. Hwang i-bong, ÒNanmuhan n Pukhan Ch ngbo, Beijing- i Nam-gwa PukÓ [Chaotic in-
telligence about North Korea, the North and the South in Beijing] in 
 
Sin TongÕa
 
 [New East Asia],
no. 5 (1999), KINDS, 
 
,
 
http://www.kinds.or.kr
 
.
 
. This article mentions that North Korean prosti-
tutes are especially popular among South Korean clients.
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within China: Obviously, this is either difÞcult or impossible. The situation
also adversely affects the legal standing of children born to these unions. To some
extent, however, the authorities do take into account the actuality: according
to the South Korean press, if a refugee is facing deportation, she is permitted to
choose whether to take her children with her or leave them in China (in view
of the grim situation in the DPRK, most women prefer to leave their children
with their fathers).18
Refugees who are not married to ÒlocalsÓ earn their living through casual or
unskilled labor. They are typically employed as waitresses or dishwashers in
restaurants or cafes, as construction workers, domestic maids, or hired farm-
hands. Some 18% of refugees surveyed in the spring of 1999 were paid, at
least in part, for their labor, while 12.4% of the total surveyed labored for bed
and food alone. An additional 10.7% of refugees lived with their Chinese rela-
tives and, we might assume, also worked in the household or family busi-
ness.19 As a rule, the refugeesÕ employers are ethnic Koreans. Because the
refugees live in the PRC illegally, their wages remain well below those of
local residentsÑa phenomenon well known to illegal migrants of all ages the
world over. The farm laborer, for example, typically receives 5 to 10 yuan (about
a dollar) per day, in addition to bed and food. In many cases, the refugees
are not paid money at all, receiving merely room and board.20 Nevertheless,
even this modest income represents a considerable bonus to the impoverished
North Koreans.
Nor does employment of a refugee come without risk, being a breach of
local law. The authorities impose on the employers large Þnes, up to 5,000 yuan
($600) per infringement.21 However, judging from anecdotal evidence, the at-
titude toward the refugees of the local population, both Han Chinese and
Korean, is generally sympathetic. In their interviews, refugees frequently de-
scribe how local residentsÑin spite of ofÞcial restrictionsÑsupplied the fugi-
tives with food and clothing, helped them reach their destinations, or hired
North Koreans even when their labor was not necessary. The following stories
have been chosen virtually at random and describe the largely benign reception
afforded refugees by the local population in 1996—99: ÒAll four of us [North
18. Kim TÕae-gy ng, ÒMa l, Sansok TÕumangsik K mg Ó [Casting-net style roundups in vil-
lages and mountains], Hangere Sinmun, July 9, 1999, p. 14.
19. Tumangang- l K nn on Saramd l, p. 25.
20. Ha Chong-dae, ÒTt don n TÕalbukja TÕaepÕung- i Nun: Haep p Angae SokÓ [The center
of the refugee storm: No solution in sight], TongÕa ilbo [East Asia Daily], August 17, 2002, p. 10;
Tumangang- l K nn on Saramd l, p. 23.
21. Kim TÕae-gy ng, ÒMa l, Sansok TÕumangsik K mg ,Ó p. 14; Yi S ng-han, ÒSonghwaha-
my n Chug yoÓ [IÕll die if I am deported], Kukmin Ilbo [CitizensÕ Daily], April 8, 2000, p. 26.
Hangere Sinmun also reports that Chinese authorities pay 500 yuan ($60) as a premium for the
denunciation of a fugitive.
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Korean women who had just crossed the Tuman River] approached one of the
houses. The gates were closed, but the owner lit lights and invited us to enter.
We told him about our situation, and [he] replied that since this was the case,
we could have a meal and stay for the night.Ó In another example, a family of
refugees reached a remote village where they could enjoy relative safety: ÒThere
was an empty house [in the village], and the villagers supplied us with clothes,
soy sauce, salt, and vegetables.Ó22 In the last few years, however, when refugees
have been ßeeing more for economic gain than from near-certain death (as
was the case in 1997—99), the attitude toward them has cooled considerably.23
In most cases, the decision to ßee to China stems from purely economic
considerations. The refugeesÑat least, the majority of themÑare not political
dissenters, in any sense. However, the large, illegal community of North Korean
refugees has unwittingly created a major political problem for the three principal
countries involved in the crisis: China, South Korea (ROK), and the DPRK.
Undesirable Brethren
The current crisis also sheds new light on SeoulÕs changing approach to the ÒNorth
Korean problem.Ó At Þrst sight, defection to South Korea would be the most
logical next step for these refugees. Indeed, Cold War logic would make us
expect that such refugees would meet an enthusiastic welcome in the South, as
was the case in the 1980s, when successful defections were very rare. The same
expectations are still common among North Koreans, who often assume that
they will be granted passage to Seoul as soon as they reach a South Korean
embassy or consulate.24 However, the world has changed and nowadays the
South Korean approach to the refugee problem is driven by a set of pragmatic
considerations. At the same time, the constraints of domestic politics prevent
Seoul from revoking its rhetorical stance, constructed during the Cold War
era. This creates a peculiar, sometimes bizarre, situation.
Indeed, only a small portion of the refugees, about 1,000, migrate to the
South each year.25 The Seoul government is remarkably unwilling to accept
22. Tumangang- l K nn on Saramd l, pp. 67, 94.
23. For remarks to this effect made by one of the refugees, see ÒPy nghwahan n Pukhan, K
imin n Mu singa?Ó [Changing North Korea: What does it mean?], Keys (a Korean-language bi-
monthly magazine), no. 7—8 (2002), ,http://www.nknet.org/kr/keys/lastkeys/2002/26/03.php..
This recent change of attitude is addressed at some length in Hangere Sinmun, August 5, 2002,
p. 1: ÒP r jin n TÕ msae: TÕalbukjaÑChaejung TongpÕo Kald ng- i SsakÓ [The growing gap:
Seeds of discord between the refugees and Chinese-Koreans].
24. A North Korean retired officer who fled to China with his wife wrote: ÒI thought that
the defection to the South would be easy, but it was not the case.Ó See Pak TÕae-y ng, ÒMije
chÕimryakja-d l Han Nom-do Namgim- psi psÕaeÕp riyajiÓ [LetÕs destroy the U.S. imperialist
aggressors up to the last man!] in Puk Han [North Korea], no. 6 (2001), p. 170.
25. According to the National Intelligence Service, 1,139 defectors arrived in the South in
2002. In 2001, there were 583 defectors, and in 2000, they numbered 312. An overwhelming
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them and this position is reßected by South Korean agencies in China. If a ref-
ugee manages to contact a South Korean consulate or embassy, he or she will
not Þnd support there unless the situation is deemed exceptional.
Ironically, some who have been denied assistance would have been seen
just a few years previously as a god-given propaganda gift. In 1996, for exam-
ple, the South Korean Embassy in Beijing was visited by a family of six
whose father, an exemplary Òshock worker,Ó had been granted the rare honor
of having his picture taken with Kim Il Sung, the Great Leader himself. The
diplomats at the time could only advise the family that they were unable to
do anything for them and wished the would-be defectors good luck! But
they had no such luckÑthey were arrested, deported back to the DPRK, and
severely punished there.26 A 36-year-old military ofÞcer from an elite secu-
rity unit who ßed to China in 1996 spent 1996—2002 repeatedly applying
for permission to migrate to the South. He contacted the South Korean
Embassy a few times but every time, diplomats advised him to Òbe patient
and wait.Ó27
Needless to say, less well-positioned people are even less fortunate. The
South Korean press is full of stories about defectors who approached South
Korean embassies or consulates but were turned away.28 One defector told a
South Korean journalist: ÒWhen I Þrst ßed the North I thought that it would be
easy to go to South Korea. With the help of ethnic Koreans, I arrived in Qingdao
[in eastern China] in August 1996. But at the Korean Consulate on which I
had pinned all my hopes [I] was told: ÔUnder the present circumstances, this
is difÞcult.Õ [I felt like] the heavens collapsed.Ó29 Another defector (who even-
tually reached his destination) told a South Korean weekly: ÒIn the early 1990s,
when I was in China, I visited the Embassy three times. I knelt there and
begged them to save my life but received only humiliation.Ó30 The present au-
thor is not aware of any story of a Ònon-connectedÓ refugee whose trip to
Seoul was arranged by South Korean ofÞcials. Obviously, only people who
majority of these moved to the South via China. See Yi Hun-gi, ÒKukunae Ipkuk TÕalbukja 5,000
My ng N m s Ó [The number of North Korean defectors in the South exceeds 5,000], TongÕa
Ilbo, November 17, 1999, p. 8.
26. ÒChÕoechÕo Kukka Kukka Anj n Powiby Chidow n.Ó
27. Ha S ng-bok, ÒHanguk Taesagwan- i Mangmy ng SinchÕ ng MoksalÓ [The Korean em-
bassy remained silent when I asked for asylum], Hangere Sinmun, May 24, 2002, p. 1.
28. For a number of such stories, see Kim Mi Y ng, ÒTÕalbuja-d l Hoego ÔNae-Ga Chu-Jung
Hakguk Taesagwan-E T r kass l TtaeÕ/Towajulsu ps ni Y gi-Es  Nagara!Ó [The defectors
recollect: ÒWhen I arrived at the Korean EmbassyÓ/ÔWe cannot help, get out of here!ÕÓ], Chos n
Ilbo, May 15, 2002, p. 55.
29. Kim Hwa-s ng, ÒHanguk Taesagwan S ulhaeng Antowaju Ó [The Korean embassy does
not assist in passage to Seoul], TongÕa Chugan [East Asia Weekly], no. 166, January 7, 1999.
30. Ko Chae-y l, ÒHaengbokhan 7 In, Purhaenghan 30 ManÓ [7 are happy, 300,000 are not], Sisa
Ch nal [Current Affairs Magazine], no. 611, July 11, 2001, KINDS, ,http://www.kinds.or.kr..
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represent a signiÞcant propaganda value (or have had access to important
intelligence) can count on such assistance, as was the case of Hwang Chang-
y p, a former North Korean chief ideologist who in 1997 defected to the
South via China.
Another privileged group are refugees who have relatives in South Korea or
in Western countries. If these relatives are able (and willing) to provide the
refugees with money, many of their problems can be solved. In most cases,
the relatives pay smugglers who arrange the refugeesÕ trip to South Korea. Once
in the South, the refugees turn themselves over to the authorities. Because they
are, technically speaking, citizens of the ROK, extradition is out of the question,
so they receive the full rights of a South Korean citizen, and even modest Þ-
nancial aid to which all defectors are eligible. It was estimated in 2000 that more
than half of all defectors had South Korean relatives. These relatives paid
brokers, whose help was crucial.31 Nevertheless, the expenses involved are
quite high, typically about $10,000, and only a fraction of refugee relatives
are willing to pay such a sum.32
The South Korean reluctance to accept refugees is based on several prag-
matic considerations. One is the governmentÕs unwillingness to create prob-
lems in its relations with China. The PRC carefully maintains neutrality in the
inter-Korean conßict and does not wish to become a transition zone for unruly
crowds of refugees heading for Seoul. Indeed, this explanation is often cited
by diplomats in their talks with asylum seekers. Some refugees who take these
explanations at face value decide to move to countries in Southeast Asia or
Mongolia where, they Þgure, South Korean diplomatic missions would be
more supportive. Such a trip is arduous and risky. Quite often in the South Ko-
rean missions in Hanoi and/or Bangkok, refugees encounter the same attitude
as in Beijing.33
Another often-cited reason for the less-than-enthusiastic welcome of aspir-
ing defectors is that South Korean ofÞcials are also wary of ethnic Koreans
from China, who might try to pass themselves off as North Koreans in order to
o
ö
31. Yun In-jin, Pukhan TÕaljumin- i Ihae-wa Chawonpongsa [Voluntary service and support
of North Korean refugees] (Seoul: Kory  taehakkyo, 2000), p. 10.
32. ÒMaking a successful defection takes a lot of money and requires the involvement of many
people, including North Korean officials and Chinese brokers,Ó according to Cho Dong-young,
chairman of the Korean Assembly for the Reunion of Ten Million Separated Families (KARTS).
See Kim Ji-ho, ÒDefectors from North Not Always Welcomed by Southern Relatives,Ó Korea Her-
ald, January 19, 2000, p. 3.
33. For a discussion of the difficulties experienced by North Korean refugees in Southeast
Asia, see Ky Su-j ng, ÒÔBetÕ nam rutÕ Õ- i nunmulÓ [Tears of the ÒVietnamese routeÓ] in Han-
gere 21, no. 254, April 22, 1999. For remarks to the same effect, see Ò25 in- i tÕalbuk, nugu- i
chakpÕum inga?Ó [The escape of the Twenty-five: Whose achievement?] in Sisa Ch nal, no. 648,
March 28, 2002, KINDS, ,http://www.kinds.or.kr..
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get access to ROK citizenship.34 These worries are justiÞed, at least, in part. In
September 2002, the South Korean government reported that from 1999 to
2002 there had been 15 known attempts of Chinese citizens passing themselves
off as North Koreans.35
Nevertheless, it appears that the major, if rarely stated, reason behind SeoulÕs
passivity is a tacit understanding that refugees, who are largely uneducated
peasants, have little hope of successfully adjusting to South Korean society.
Once in South Korea, in all probability they will become an additional source
of social tension and require support through the welfare system for the rest of
their lives. There is already some evidence of this: Among those North Korean
defectors of working age who have managed to reach the South, about 50%
have not been able to Þnd full-time employment, in spite of South KoreaÕs tra-
ditionally low unemployment rate, 3%—4% in 2002—03. Among defectors who
have found a job, 80% earn less than one million won (US$900) per monthÑ
half the national average.36 Therefore, refugees are likely to become a burden
on the South Korean government.
However, we can identify, with reasonable conÞdence, another, somewhat
paradoxical, reason for the ROKÕs reluctance to help the refugees: Seoul
does not want to destabilize its ex-enemy. A large-scale exodus to the South
would likely cause a serious political crisis in Pyongyang, leading, in all
probability, to a Òhard landingÓ for the North Korean regime. This is exactly
the scenario that South Korean diplomacy strives to prevent; in recent years,
ÒGerman-type uniÞcationÓ has been seen as a nightmare, to be avoided at
all costs.
A great deal of ideological and legalistic inertia also contributes to the ROKÕs
reluctance to assume responsibility for the refugees. For decades, the Seoul
government has insisted that it is the only legitimate government of all Korea.
34. This is the reason why all defectors who manage to cross into the South are normally re-
quired to produce North Korean identification. The inability to produce such proof of origin might
mean rejection, even on South Korean soil. Kim Yong-hwa, a former North Korean officer who
fled to China in 1988, was rejected by the South Korean missions in China and Vietnam. In 1995,
he was extradited by the South Korean immigration service after he had secretly arrived on the
South Korean coast on a small boat. The reason for the rejection was that he carried only Chinese
identification and could not present documents proving his North Korean origins. KimÕs misfor-
tunes became a major media issue. As usual, publicity helped: To avoid embarrassment, the Seoul
authorities allowed him into the country. KimÕs story has been retold a number of times, e.g., Yi
Y ng-jong, Ò14 Ny n Yurang Kim Yong-Hwa Ssi ÔTÕakbukjaÕ Inj ngtoel T sÓ [Kim Yong-hwa
is recognized as a ÔNorth Korean defectorÕ after 14 years of wandering], ChungÕang Ilbo, March
2, 2002, p. 34.
35. Ch n S k-un, Ò1999 Ihu Wijang TÕalbukja 15 My ng Ch kbalÓ [Since 1999, 15 pseudo-
refugees have been unmasked], Kukmin Ilbo, September 16, 2002, p. 2.
36. Pak Yun-chÕ l, ÒTÕalbukja 1000 My ng Sidae: tt kÕe Salgo Issna?Ó [The era of 1,000
refugees: How do they live?], TongÕa Ilbo, November 17, 1999, p. 8.
o
ö
o
ö
o
ö
u
ö
o
ö
o
ö
o
ö
o
ö
o
ö
o
ö
O
ö
o
ö
ANDREI LANKOV 867
Therefore, all North Koreans are, by deÞnition, citizens of South Korea who
theoretically enjoy the right of protection. An open renouncement of this
decades-old position would be fraught with numerous ideological and legal
problems because it would imply the renouncement of the long-standing Þc-
tion of Òone Korea.Ó Such a turn of events is likely to upset the entire South
Korean political spectrum.
This contradiction between ofÞcial legalistic rhetoric and the actual policies
of the countries involved was exposed starkly in late 1999 when the fate of a
handful of North Korean refugees facing extradition to Russia brießy made
the refugee problem a much-discussed issue within Korea itself. In October
1999, Minister for UniÞcation Lim Tong-won told the National Assembly that
the Ògovernment is ready to accept all North Korean refugees, if they want to
emigrate to the South.Ó He also added: ÒIt is the basic principle of the Seoul
government to welcome all North Korean refugees. . . . [I]t is in line with the
Constitution to accommodate [North Korean] refugees.Ó37 This statement
once again expressed the traditional position of the ROK government, which
has asserted that protection of all North Koreans is its legal duty. However, the
Ministry for UniÞcation immediately ÒclariÞedÓ the ministerial statement. A
senior ofÞcial there explained to reporters that the ministerÕs remarks referred
to a Ògroup of North Koreans who had wrapped up all the necessary proce-
dures for entry into South Korea with the nationÕs overseas embassies.Ó Such
a ÒclariÞcationÓ effectively rendered the ministerÕs statement meaningless, as
it excluded virtually all refugees in China, none of whom had valid passports
(and who often had no identiÞcation documents at all), thus making it impos-
sible for them to Òwrap upÓ any entry.
Over the last two years, South KoreaÕs press and NGOs have widely dis-
cussed plans to createÑwith Chinese endorsementÑspecial refugee camps,
which could be located in China or adjacent countries, such as Mongolia or
Thailand. From the South Korean point of view, these would be a cheap solu-
tion to the problem.38 There is little doubt that supporting the refugees in such
camps would be much less expensive than bringing them to South Korea. The
adoption of such a policy would allow Seoul to mute criticism from the domes-
tic opposition without taking on an excessive Þnancial burden or renouncing
established ideological Þctions. However, a prerequisite for such a solution
37. Both Yim Tong-wonÕs statement and its ÒclarificationÓ attracted much attention and were
reported by all Korean media. Here, we use the English wording of the Korea Times, which re-
ported both the ministerial statement and its effective withdrawal in the same October 18, 1999,
issue, albeit in different articles (Kim Yong-bom, ÒKorea to Accept All NK Refugees,Ó p. 2 and
Son Key-young, ÒSeoul Lacks Practical Means to Accept N. Korean Defectors,Ó p. 3.
38. Such plans have been widely discussed in the South Korean press. See, for example, Kim
Chae-bon, ÒTÕalbukja pÕInanchÕo Mary nharaÓ [Give North Korean refugees a place to shelter],
Munhwa Ilbo [Culture Daily], September 6, 2002, p. 7.
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would be Chinese willingness to guarantee the North Koreans refugee status,
a step Beijing is not willing to take.
Beijing’s Choices
The PRC government has its own stakes in the problem. First of all, Beijing
sees the North Koreans as a potentially troublesome nuisance. When, in Au-
gust 2002, the Chinese ambassador to South Korea was interviewed by the
Taehan Maeil [Great Korea Daily], an inßuential South Korean newspaper, he
replied to a question about refugees, ÒSince the economic situation in North
Korea recently deteriorated, some North Korean citizens have illegally crossed
the border to China. Taking into consideration the reasons for their arrival in
China as well as international law, they cannot be seen as ÔrefugeesÕ. We will
protect order on our borders, while treating them according to humanitarian
political principles.Ó39 The same deÞnition of the North Koreans as illegal im-
migrants (rather than refugees) has been reiterated by a number of Chinese
ofÞcials on different occasions.40
Their underlying concerns are easy to identify: If Beijing grants the North
Koreans much-coveted refugee status, this will have two important conse-
quences. First, China will have to provide them some aid. Currently, the refu-
gees are fending for themselves and do not cost the central authorities a yuan;
in general, their cheap labor might be even beneÞcial to the Chinese economy.
The second, presumably much more important, reason for the Chinese reluctance
to treat the North Korean migrants as refugees is political: Such treatment
might encourage further defections, which would probably lead to destabiliza-
tion of the North Korean regime. After all, the dramatic disintegration of East
Germany occurred when hitherto ÒfraternalÓ Hungary refused to prevent
East Germans from crossing into its territory and seeking asylum in West Ger-
many. No doubt this lesson of history is not lost on Beijing.
For ordinary refugees, the only way to enter the South is to attract a modi-
cum of attention to themselves. In the late 1990s, this usually implied cultivat-
ing relations with the South Korean press, since media involvement and the
associated publicity occasionally helped. Recently, the refugees, or, more cor-
rectly, the NGOs involved with them, have discovered a much more efÞcient
way to grab media attention. They stage semi-symbolic takeovers of foreign
diplomatic missions and agencies. Quite often the foreign press is informed of
39. ÒChung Taesa IntÕ byu: 2Ó [Interview with the Chinese ambassador: 2], Taehan Maeil, Au-
gust 22, 2002, p. 5.
40. See, for example, a lengthy interview of Zhu Liang, former head of the International De-
partment of the Communist Party of ChinaÕs Central Committee, in the October 2002 issue of Wol-
gan Chungang [Central Monthly]. Zhu sometimes describes the refugees as Òillegal trespassersÓ
(Korean: pulpop wolgy ngja).
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the forthcoming Òattack,Ó and such events unfold in front of foreign camera
crews and journalists, thus ensuring worldwide publicity. The remarkable so-
phistication of these events (leaßets in good English, presence of foreign cam-
era crews, etc.) is obviously a result of heavy involvement by foreign NGOs.41
Sometimes the planners of such break-ins demonstrate remarkable sophisti-
cation; this is necessary, because embassies are heavily guarded in China. For
example, during the ÒtakeoverÓ of the Canadian Embassy on September 29,
2004, the defectors, dressed as construction workers, placed three large lad-
ders against the embassy wall and climbed it before the guards noticed that
something was going on. By the time the guards raised alarm, 44 North Kore-
ans were inside the embassy compound.42
The Þrst such occupation took place in June 2001, when seven North Kore-
ans, all members of the same family, took refuge in the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) ofÞce in Beijing. The real Òhigh seasonÓ
of intrusions began in 2002. From March to September, events were staged in
seven foreign missions: the embassies of South Korea, Canada, Germany,
Albania, Spain, and the U.S., as well as in Japanese and American consulates
in Shenyang and in a German international school.
Generally, this strategy works. Once South Korean diplomatic ofÞcials are
faced with such a crisis, they have no choice but to arrange for the refugeesÕ
removal to Seoul, even though, under less-dramatic circumstances, embassy
staffers would barely deal with them. In most cases, the sides involved appear
to have done their best to solve the crisis as soon as possible, apparently to
minimize publicity and press coverage. In this regard, the interests of China,
the ROK, and the DPRK hardly differ. As of late December 2002, some 160
North Koreans are known to have successfully used foreign missions for their
escape to the South.43
The occupation of foreign missions may be a good publicity stunt that helps
those directly involved in such bold actions. However, successful occupations
have their downside: They adversely inßuence the position of the majority of
refugees. Needless to say, the Chinese authorities did not look at the occupa-
tions favorably. The dramaticÑand dramatizedÑevents in Beijing underlined
the economic impotence and political instability of ChinaÕs ally, as well as
41. The most prominent role belongs to Norbert Vollertsen, a German medical doctor who
once worked in North Korea. In May 2002, Dr. Vollertsen described his strategy frankly to South
Korean journalists: ÒI came to recognize that creating big events covered by the global media is the
only way to help resolve the defector issue.Ó See Shim Chae-yun, ÒNGOs Offer Conflicting Pros-
pects for Defection,Ó Korea Times, May 17, 2002, p. 3.
42. ÒDaring Asylum Bid in Beijing,Ó CNN report on September 29, 2004, ,http://edition.
cnn.com..
43. ÒBeijing T gil Hakkyo Chinip TÕalbukja 4 My ng S ul HaengÓ [Four refugees who broke
into the German school in Beijing are moving to Seoul], Taehan Maeil, December 25, 2002, p. 2.
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raising doubts about the Chinese authoritiesÕ ability to control their own capital.
Therefore, from September 2002 onward, security measures around foreign em-
bassies in Beijing were stepped up and in December, the Chinese police began
large-scale hunts for refugees in the three provinces of the Chinese Northeast.
This effort was known as the Òhundred-day battle,Ó because it was meant to
last from mid-December to mid-March. The initiative obviously came from
the Chinese side, even if the North Korean authorities were also quite eager to
participate by sending their police ofÞcers across the border. According to
press reports, during late December and early January alone, the massive
searches led to the arrest and subsequent extradition of some 4,500 refugees.44
The spectacular refugee actions of 2002 would have been impossible with-
out the help of international and South Korean NGOs.45 Therefore, the Chi-
nese authorities began to harass the refugeesÕ advisers. In December 2002, in
Jilin Province, a group of foreign and Chinese nationals stood trial for Òpeople
smuggling.Ó The group included a South Korean pastor, a Korean-American,
four North Korean citizens, and 12 Chinese nationals (the latter being ethnic
Koreans). All these individuals had allegedly been involved in staging the es-
capes of North Koreans.46 It is noteworthy that their arrest and subsequent
trial did not receive much coverage in the Seoul press, reßecting the ambiva-
lence of South KoreaÕs approach to the refugee issue.
To some extent, North KoreaÕs reaction to the crisis reßects the same gap
between the inertia of Cold War rhetoric and PyongyangÕs new pragmatism-
driven policies, a gap that is also obvious in SeoulÕs reaction. Until the
44. Cho S ng-jin, ÒChung, TÕalbukja Taeg  Kangje HwangsongÓ [Large-scale deportations of
North Korean Refugees in China], Syegye Ilbo [World Daily], January 10, 2003, p. 3; Kim Chae-
bong, ÒKk ly kan n TÕabukjaÓ [The refugees who are taken away], Munhwa Ilbo, February 5,
2003, p. 7. The timing of the entire operation might be related to the fact that during these three
months, the rivers are frozen, making crossing even easier.
45. Among major institutions involved in providing North Koreans with assistance, two de-
serve mention. Helping Hand Korea (HHK) makes a clear statement on the front page of its official
website: ÒFrom 1998, HHK diversified its assistance activities to North Korea by giving special
emphasis to direct aid for North Korean refugees in China and, in extraordinary circumstances, co-
ordinating logistical support for their escape to third countries.Ó See ,http://www.familycare.org/
network/p01.htm., accessed October 9, 2004. Also notable are the Japanese NGO Life Funds for
North Korean Refugees and a number of South Korean groups, often associated with religious
organizations.
46. ÒChung, TÕalbuk Als nhoe 7 My ng Ch ngsik ChaepÕan ChÕaksuÓ [Seven people are
standing trial for helping North Korean refugees], Kukmin Ilbo, December 7, 2002, p. 2. The leader
of the group, pastor ChÕoe Pong-il, was condemned to nine yearsÕ imprisonment. See Hong In-
pÕy , ÒTÕalbuk Chiwon Hanguk-in 9 My ng Chungs  Sugam ChungÓ [Nine Koreans are in Chi-
nese prisons for helping [people] escape from the North], ibid., March 20, 2004, p. 6. ChÕoe was
released after two years in prison and returned to Seoul in September 2004. Han Chang-h i,
ÒChung-s  PÕully nan ChÕoe Pong-il MoksaÓ [Pastor ChÕoe Pong-il released from a prison in
China], ibid., September 24, 2004, p. 8.
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mid-1990s, DPRK authorities treated an attempted border crossing as a seri-
ous political crime. However, since the beginning of the Great Famine around
1996, North Korean authorities have dramatically softened their policy toward
fugitives, likely because of their large numbers and the obvious lack of politi-
cal motivation behind their behavior. Illegal border crossings are now treated
as a relatively minor offense, even if the authorities do not recognize this
openly. Although occasional reports of executions of apprehended defectors
do surface, these appear to be the exception and often involve those who (with
or without reason) are accused of espionage or subversive activities. The ma-
jority of the defectors who are apprehended by border guards or extradited
from China are detained for only a short term, normally, a week or two. Dur-
ing their detention, they are subjected to police interrogation. If they are not
found guilty of any serious offense, they are sent to Òlabor reeducation,Ó a pe-
riod of forced labor lasting a few months. According to a recent study that
summarizes available data on the treatment of deportees, an astonishing 40%
of them return to China after their release from detention.47
In Lieu of Conclusion: The Refugees and 
the Future of the North Korean State
The majority of refugees do not intend to enter South Korea. Their major pur-
pose is, essentially, survival: They wish to avoid starvation and survive until
the end of North KoreaÕs ÒdifÞcult times.Ó Many refugees avail themselves of
any opportunity to send money or goods back home. Occasionally, they make
home visits themselves, crossing the border to the North, spending some time
with their families and then returning to China. The mode of living of such
refugees might be called a hybrid of shuttle trading, smuggling, and fugitive
status. In this regard, the Chinese side does have good reason for describing
them as Òillegal migrants,Ó not Òrefugees.Ó As early as 1998—99, internal pa-
pers of the North Korean police reportedly stated that a majority of refugees
eventually come back after a brief sojourn in China.48
Why did the Stalinist DPRK, normally not known for its tolerance of unau-
thorized interaction with the outside world, choose to be so lenient toward its
fugitives? Perhaps the South Korean unwillingness to accept refugees per-
suaded Pyongyang that the political risks involved are relatively low. The exodus
of more restive portions of its population might save the bankrupt state from
the troublesome necessity of caring for people it is unable to feed anyway.
Tolerance also may be seen as a safety valve, because people who ßee the
47. ÒTÕalbujad l- i TÕalchÕul Kwaj ng-gwa Songhwan Hu- i Unmy ng,Ó Keys, no. 6 (2002),
,http://www.nknet.org/kr/keys/lastkeys/2002/25/03.php..
48. See ÒChÕoechÕo Kukka Kukka Anj n Powiby Chidow n.Ó
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country are less likely to cause political unrest. Refugees even remand some
foreign currency, which is sorely needed by Pyongyang.
Whatever the reason for the current degree of tolerance, the refugee crisis is
likely to have serious consequences. The ÒEast German scenarioÓ of defec-
tions triggering a regimeÕs collapse does not appear particularly likely, but
cannot be ignored completely.
There is no doubt that in the long run, the refugees will profoundly impact
North Korean society. The refugees have now become the Þrst statistically
signiÞcant group of North Koreans to have Þrsthand experience abroad. For
decades, the North Korean authorities have gone to great lengths to ensure
that no ordinary citizens would have access to unauthorized information about
foreign countries, particularly about South Korea. However, the refugees are
breaking this self-imposed information blockade. They have seen the results
(both good and bad) of market reforms in China and are painfully aware of
North KoreaÕs backwardness and poverty. They bring back small transistor ra-
dios that have spread across the country in recent years. This is important, be-
cause all privately owned radios in North Korea have been required to have
Þxed tuning, thereby only permitting listeners to receive the few ofÞcial
broadcasts. Returned refugees also have some inkling of South KoreaÕs pros-
perity and some of the younger ones have even surfed South Korean Internet
sites. They are less likely to believe ofÞcial propaganda. And they are too nu-
merous to be silenced or isolated.49 
Internationally, the refugees constitute a considerable nuisance to the au-
thorities of at least three countries. Sadly, in fact, the refugees, whose only goal
is survival (or, perhaps, a slight improvement in their lot) have become victims
of the real or perceived political interests of Beijing, Pyongyang, and Seoul.
For Pyongyang, the refugee problem is a reminder of the disastrous social
situation in the country. It is impossible to pretend that, as the propaganda sug-
gests, North Korea is a ÒParadise on Earth,Ó if so many citizens attempt to es-
cape from its supposedly happy and afßuent life. Moreover, it is highly likely
that refugees are sometimes used by the South Korean intelligence services,
which thereby, for the Þrst time since the early 1970s, have acquired a means
49. On the spread of small radios and interest in South Korean broadcasts, see ÒTÕalbukja 67%
Puk-e iss ss l ttae Namhan Radio ChÕ ngchÕwiÓ [67% of all defectors listened to the South Ko-
rean broadcast while in the North], Tonga Ilbo, February 28, 2003, p. 49. A collection of interviews
with defectors conducted in Northeast China in 2003 includes a number of interviews with people
who cross the border regularly. ÒPuk-chung kukky ng choy k- l kadaÓ [Traveling in the areas
near Sino-Korean border], Keys, no. 1 (2004). On the use of Internet facilities by North Koreans in
China, see Han Chang-h i, ÒPuk silsang alliry  . . . TÕalbukja hompÕi kaes lÓ [To tell about the
real situation in the North . . . A defector establishes a home page], Kukmin Ilbo, July 6, 2004,
p. 8; Yi Mi-suk, ÒKas mi Ullin TÕalbukja e-meilÓ [An emotional e-mail from a defector], Munhwa
Ilbo, May 28, 2002, p. 2.
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of inÞltrating the North. Last but not least, the refugees have created a signiÞ-
cant breach in North KoreaÕs carefully maintained wall of isolation from the
outside world.
The Chinese authorities are not happy about the presence of many illegal
immigrants in their country. Apart from the economic and social problems ref-
ugees cause (or may cause) in the cities of Northeast China, their presence
creates a number of diplomatic problems and adversely inßuences relations
between China and the two Koreas. China also worries about the stability of
North Korea, which serves as a strategically important buffer between the
Chinese Northeast and the U.S. forces in South Korea. The ideological afÞnity
between the two states may also play a part in the Chinese stance: It does not
hurt Beijing to have another Communist regime nearby.
The South Korean authorities also Þnd themselves in an uneasy position.
On the one hand, they are expected to do something for the refugees who, as
they themselves insist, are their compatriots and even, theoretically, their citi-
zens. On the other hand, South Korea is reticent about playing host to the ref-
ugees because, as Seoul understands only too well, such a humanitarian act in
the long term will be very costly. In addition, Seoul wants to avoid unneces-
sary problems in its relations with China, an important trading and political
partner. Lastly, in recent years South Korea has come to fear a German-style
uniÞcation, which is seen as an exceedingly costly option, to be avoided if
possible. Therefore, Seoul is not willing to support any developments that
might lead to the collapse of its traditional adversary.
Surprisingly, with regard to the defectors, the interests of the three countries
do not differ. All three want the defectors to remain invisible and not create
much political trouble. Judging by the reaction of the international media to
the defections, the three countries have been reasonably successful in achiev-
ing this goal: Despite the occasional story, as with the intrusions into foreign
missions in Beijing, one of the largest international migrations in the post-war
history of the region remains essentially unnoticed by world media. Among
the array of potential protectors of these troubled people, perhaps only a hand-
ful of NGOs really care about the suffering of the refugees, instead of focus-
ing on the diplomatic nuisance or political embarrassment they may create.
